The case of the severely deformed infant, whether mentally or physically deficient in gross degree, no less than the case of the elderly, desperately and chronically sick, presents us, as Bertram (1963) , a prominent eugenicist has pointed out, with aspects 'which are emotional and ethical, rational and traditional, of the head and of the heart'. In both instances, it may be possible to extend life thanks to modern technological advances. Now many individuals, young children and the aged, who formerly would have died in days or weeks, can be kept alive for months or years, but in states of mind and body which, if not a misery to themselves, may cause the greatest distress to their families. In many instances the quality by which we recognize our fellow menthe presence of mental lifemay be minimal or nonexistent.
Most doctors know where they stand in this matter, recognizing that they have two duties: to preserve and extend life wherever possible; and to alleviate suffering. The doctor's duty is always to his individual patientto do his best for him. How he does this is a matter for his judgment, wisdom, conscience and skill, and what he does is determined by the circumstances of the individual patient and the facilities available to him. Certainly modern medical advances, while coming to his aid more often than not, may at times make his task more complex and difficult. His two duties, to preserve life and alleviate suffering, may provide him with antithetical objectives. In these circumstances most doctors would agree with the text of the Bishop of Exeter's sermon at the 128th Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association in 1960: 'Thou shalt not kill, but needst not strive officiously to keep alive.'
The Bishop was speaking in this instance about the plight of very old people, and the essence of his theme was 'in general the Christian view that while there was a moral obligation to maintain the life of very old persons by all ordinary means, there was no obligation to use extraordinary means'. I do not propose to attempt to pursue the moral theologian's point of view very far, since there are others far better equipped than I who will follow me. Can one extend, however, the Bishop of Exeter's advice, which referred to the very old and sick, to the newborn severely defective and to all other classes of patients whose plight, given only ordinary means of medical care is immediately desperate, and for whom the future holds no prospect of a reasonable life. This matter is very well discussed in the Church Assembly Board for Social Responsibility's monograph 'Decisions about Life and Death' (Church Information Office 1965) . It is evident that it may be, and has been, so extended. Advice on this matter was given by Pope Pius XII in 1957 to a Congress of Anesthetists. The distinction between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' medical or surgical procedures had been made by Roman Catholic moralists. I will quote from an appendix to the monograph 'Decisions about Life and Death' which outlined this Catholic advice, of which, however, the monograph is critical:
... ordinary" in this context does not mean what a medical man would regard as "normal" treatment; it means whatever a patient can obtain and undergo without thereby imposing an excessive burden on himself or others. Thus, "extraordinary" treatment has been defined as "whatever here and now is very costly or very unusual or very painful or very difficult or very dangerous or if the good effects that can be expected from its use are not proportionate to the difficulty and inconvenience that are entailed".'
With great respect to the late Pope I do not think that this advice will materially alleviate or resolve the problems of individual doctors, be they Catholic or Protestant, Christian or agnostic. Sustained and guided by the humanist Hippocratic tradition they know that their first duty lies to the individual patient. What may be regarded as 'extraordinary' treatment today, may in a year or two become 'ordinary' treatment. This has happened again and again in recent times. If the advance of medical science and then the State makes such 'extraordinary' treatment increasingly available, who shall say to whom and when it shall be denied? Are economic factors to be the final arbiters? Is the quality of human life more important than its quantity and if this principle were ever officially accepted, how does this reflect on our responsibilities as doctors?
There are about 15,000 defective babies born each year in this country. As we have heard from Dr Mac Keith, the outlook for the less severely defective, who are more numerous, is increasingly encouraging. A majority can be educated to lead useful and rewarding lives, but the cost to society although it cannot be computed, is great, not so much in financial terms but in terms of utilization of increasing numbers of special teachers, social workers, doctors and those in professions auxiliary to medicine. For the severely defective, mentally and physically, the outlook has changed very little, except that biochemical and biological research has resulted in control of the worst effects of a few of the genetic disorders, such as phenylketonuria. More may follow but in the aggregate the proportion for whom relief may be expected is very small, for the worst cases are those in whom a combination of gross physical and central nervous system defects co-exist. We cannot anticipate that from the time of birth, there will ever be any reprieve for these. Babies born with malformations of one kind or another that are apparent in the first year of life are very numerousabout 1 % of all children alive at one year (Ministry of Health 1963), but in many the condition is compatible with a successful life, and increasingly more can be done to ameliorate the consequences of their defects. It is not possible in many cases to assess early in life the degree of morbidity consequent upon a known defect, nor how much can be done to ameliorate it. The overall picture is one of graded degrees of disability between the severely defective (mentally, physically or both) and, at the other end of the scale, the 'normal' individual with a specific defect of intellectual function of limited consequence, or the individual of normal intelligence with, say, congenital dislocation of the hips or cleft palate. The majority of those who survive, and an increasing majority as recent research has shown, will be found ultimately to be able to lead useful lives. A smaller number, identifiable at birth or soon after, will never be so.
While the financial costs of treating, caring for and educating all these unfortunates are considerable, they are not overwhelming. In the decade 1954-63 there was an increase of 6,500 in the number of severely mentally defective patients in subnormality hospitals (Ministry of Health 1965) . This increase is due partly to the fact that greater provision has been made in these hospitals for such patients (and more is needed), but also partly to the improved chance of survival from advances in medical and surgical practice. On the other hand the economic cost, in terms of the number of trained personnel necessary to support them, is much more serious. There is a grave shortage of teachers of the subnormal, which it will not be easy to remedy. The number of doctors attracted to a career in this field falls far short of the actual needs, and this has been the case for many years. The story is similar for nurses.
Abel-Smith (1965) has pointed out that there are now fewer registered nurses per mental hospital patient than in 1937. The hospital cost of caring for those with congenital malformations is less than £4 million per annum (Cffice of Health Economics 1964), while the cost to local authorities for caring for the less severely mentally defective rises steadily-it is now over £10 million per year, most of it spent on these patients, and that it is not much larger is due only to the shortage of trained personnel (Office of Health Economics 1965).
When we turn to the problems of caring for the aged chronic sick, the pattern is not dissimilar. The hospital cost of caring for those suffering from senility is less than £4 million per annum (Office of Health Economics 1964), but what proportion of the £132 million a year spent in the Mental Health Services can be apportioned to the aged psychotic population within the hospital it is difficult to say. There are two million persons aged 75 or over in England and Wales, and a quarter of a million are aged 85 years or more. At this age there are twice as many women as men. Surveys have suggested that 10 % of the elderly at homeand the majority (perhaps 95 %) of these very old people are living at homeare so frail as to be housebound; some, indeed, are bedfast. Many continue to exist without any human contacts (Ministry of Health 1961). These very old peoplein varying degrees of mental and physical health or sickness provide the medical and social services, and the very limited institutional accommodation available, with the greatest problems. Above all, they constitute a challenge to the public conscience. We may ask ourselves what proportion of society's assets, financial, but above all in personnel, can and should be apportioned to that percentage of the population, which is steadily increasing, which cannot of itself contribute to the national budget, but is in turn entirely dependent on it ?
I have stated what I believe the doctor's personal role and attitudes are, and where I believe his responsibilities lie. It is necessary that he should maintain his position in this, since without it he stands to lose the confidence of his individual patients who put their trust in him, as well as that of the relatives who equally depend upon him. Doctors, however, like other men and women are subject to a social process which results in change of attitudes and values. This is reflected, for example, in the changed social attitudes to termination of pregnancy. Most people who would view with utter repugnance the calculated termination of life of the severely defective once born, would not so demur at the termination of the pregnancy that would result in such a birth, if it were done with the mother's consent and with the certain knowledge, if that were available, of the consequences of allowing it to go to term. The difficulty here, as always, is that certain knowledge is rarely available, and as Professor McKeown has pointed out, will be very difficult to obtain. Nevertheless, the answer to these problems must come from medical research to identify with as great a precision as possible those at risk, to prevent the conception of the gravely defective and malformed or, when this is not possible, to identify the disorder early in pregnancy.
Will the doctor in the future be able to maintain his personal role and independence? Will he always be able to make his decisions based on the interests of the patient alone? He must never be put in the position that his decisions are made from economic necessity or expedience. If it should come about, as no doubt it will, that the interests of society at large are in conflict with those of the individual, then in matters of life and death he must serve the individual patient first and last.
Nevertheless, we must view the future with awe and anxiety. Our population is steadily increasing and by the year 2000 will have become 65 million. Even in ten years' time there will be an additional 2 million persons over the age of 65 and this, in crude figures, will add £88 million to the National Health Service bill (Office of Health Economics 1966). Already half a million persons are employed in the Health Service, and already there are grave shortages, particularly of personnel in those sectors where personal care of patients is paramount.
Already the NHS is costing five times as much as those who wrote the Beveridge Report expected. Great technological advances will no doubt occur and many skilled and intelligent workers will be needed to use them. Automation is unlikely to free the sort of people needed for the care of the chronic sick and the elderly. It is not only in the Health and Welfare Services that the shortage is so acute, but in all fields where care and education are concerned. If it is true that by 1972 there will be a shortage of 69,000 full-time teachers in the primary and secondary State schools (The Times May 10, 1967) , what chances have we of recruiting several thousand additional teachers for the subnormal, as well as psychiatric social workers, mental welfare workers, health visitors, nurses, psychologists, occupational therapists, doctors, teachers of the deaf and teachers of the blind, and many others? A prediction has been made that our total population will increase by 40% in twenty-five years, and the proportion of it which is totally dependent for expert personal care will increase disproportionately. In a society in which there may be enforced leisure for that half of the population which is less intelligent, the demands on that other sector of the intelligence distribution, from which must come those who will provide medical and social care and education, will become inordinate.
I would like to conclude on this note of anxiety by quoting from a paper by Gunnar Biorck (1965) of the Karolinska Institute: 'The social and economic climate in which this development may be expected to occur strongly favours emphasis on technical developments in preference to time-honoured personal care of the sick and suffering. We are likely to get two privileged groups, and one neglected group, among our patients. The healthy wage-earner will become the privileged, for whom a battery of health-screening procedures will be available without cost. Privileged also will become anyone suffering from a sufficiently interesting disease to warrant special investigations and the assemblage of technical experts for diagnosis and treatment. The underprivileged will be the aged, the worn out, the deteriorated, and, perhaps still more, the psychologically maladaptedin short, the useless, the uninteresting, and the nuisance.'
Dr J Wedgwood (Bury St Edmunds) said he would like to come down from the heights to something much more mundane: the cost of treatment of the ordinary, everyday patient in the ordinary medical or surgical ward or geriatric unit such as the one in which he worked. While he agreed with Sir Denis Hill's point that one must always put the patient first, he thought there was a case for looking closely at the costing of treatment and investigation of patients. He thought the present type of statistics putout for hospital purposes were grossly misleading, particularly those giving the average cost per patient for an average week. He would emphasize the great need to cost occasionally the amount spent on individual patients. Five years ago such a survey was carried out in his own hospital and it was very revealing. It was connected with the cost of drugs, but a survey could be made to include the cost of investigations, and that would, he thought, be even more revealing. It was found that in an average geriatric unit anything from £5 for one patient to 3kd for another was spent on drugs. If one looked at the results of such a survey, and compared them with the welfare of the patient and with how much one thought one was doing for the patient, it was very humbling and helpful.
Dr Michael Craft thought Sir Denis Hill's paper was very pessimistic. What he tried to do in his earlier contribution to the discussion was to suggest that if facilities were deployed to more effective use more would be got out of them. On the figures for London there were some 330 beds for subnormal children per million population. The figures he gave indicated that by schooling these children effectively, most could later do a job (in a sheltered workshop) when they left school, rather than continue within hospital. North Wales figures suggest 70 school places per million population for children with IQ 0 to 50, and 100 hospital beds. He would admit this was a higher figure than later might prove to be needed.
But a total of 170 places per million, for schooling and for the vegetative, was only half the provision now being made. He thought proper schooling would help to reduce the long waiting lists in London. Sir Denis Hill said that he had great admiration for Dr Craft's work, but his own anxieties were not on the financial side. It did not matter to him whether 20 % of the national budget was spent on medicine and the care of people; that was for society to work out. What did worry him was that at the moment, he did not see enough people of the right intelligence and education being motivated to come into this area of medical social care. As the proportion of people needed increased, he felt that there would be fewer and fewer people to do the job. That was what worried him, not the money.
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Sanctity of Life
by Professor David Daube DCL Dr hon.c.Paris (All Souls College, Oxford) I propose to deal with three topics: euthanasia, abortion and the cost of expensive procedures.
Euthanasia
In normal conditions in modem countries, euthanasia for those hopelessly ill and threatened by unbearable suffering no longer constitutes a genuine problem. There are analgesics; and if the requisite dose is such as to speed death, the general consensus is, or will be shortly, that (except in special circumstances, e.g. where the patient dissents) it should none the less be administered.
Here let me say a word about the so-called double effect. Many Roman Catholics adopt a permissive stand on this point because the principal effect intended is the elimination of pain, while the hastening of death is merely a secondary effect regretfully put up with. It is often contended (for instance by Williams 1957,) that this construction may encourage hypocrisy; and no doubt the danger does exist, as in many comparable cases of moral distinction. But it may also encourage an enhanced consciousness of the precariousness of the action and, with it, of the limits beyond which you may not go. A doctor who simply asks himself whether it is better to kill the patient or not to kill him is more easily led to overstep them than one who asks himself whether, in the particular situation, it is his duty to relieve the pain even though it will kill the patient.
Admittedly, the very setting of limits is in pursuance of a value judgment, which may be disputed. None the less I regard it as an advantage to occupy a position which excludes, for instance, the despatching of the old who are not otherwise terribly afflicted.
By the way, 1 agree with the lusty octogenarian lady debater who protested against a fixed drawing up of age groups. I suggest that a young man is one whom a pretty girl can make happy or unhappy; a middle-aged man is one whom a pretty girl can make happy but no longer unhappy; and an old man is one whom a girl can no longer make either happy or unhappy. With women, it is quite otherwise. A woman's declining years are under 25: she rarely declines after.
